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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

A Statement of the Thesis

This thesis explores the relationship between President Jimmy Carter’s administration
(1977-1981) and Brazil’s military regime, which was led by two generals—President Ernesto
Geisel (1974-1979) and President João Figueiredo (1979-1985). Despite his message around the
importance of human rights and his critiques of Latin American dictatorships, Carter’s White
House ended up being pragmatic in its connections with Brasília. In the first year of this term,
U.S. foreign policy annoyed the Brazilian government as Washington attempted to force West
Germany to cancel a nuclear agreement established with Brazil in 1975—an initiative that failed.
Moreover, the First Lady's visit to the country in 1977 also irritated Brasília due to the way
Rosalynn Carter interacted with politicians from the opposition and activists against the regime.
As a response to Carter’s approach, the Brazilian government decided to revoke its 25-year
mutual defense treaty with the United States.
Under the pressure of American enterprises with businesses in Brazil, the press, and the
U.S. Congress, the White House started a new strategy to reconnect with the officials of the
largest economy in Latin America. In his visit to Brasília to meet Ernesto Geisel in 1977, Carter
did not criticize the regime or make statements on human rights. Nevertheless, Brazil’s
government and the opposition—neither of which had appreciated American interference in local
matters in the previous year—continued to reject new agreements and initiatives with their U.S.
counterparts. Beyond that, President Geisel rejected an official invitation by the White House to
visit Washington. His successor, President João Figueiredo, did not show interest in establishing
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deep ties with Carter’s administration. Meanwhile, Brasília went ahead with its nuclear program
with West Germany and developed a diplomatic approach to Portuguese-speaking African
nations, especially Angola—whose government was ideologically close to the Soviet Union.
This work shows how Carter’s foreign policy, therefore, failed in the relationship with
Brazil. It undermined diplomatic dialogue and negotiation with the largest economy in Latin
America, irritated Brazilians (from all political views) with its attempt to interfere in the nuclear
agreement with West Germany, and failed to achieve improvements in human rights. Lastly, this
thesis reflects on the risks that Washington takes as it implements foreign policies without
considering the political landscape abroad. It may lead to the loss of crucial partners and affects
not only the relationship between two governments, but also between two States.

1.2

Historiography and Context

When President James Earl Carter Jr. took office in 1977, Brazil was facing a military
dictatorship, which started in 1964 when President João Goulart (1961-1964) was removed from
office. Re-democratization was not consolidated in the Latin American country until 1985, four
years after the end of Carter’s presidency, when Tancredo de Almeida Neves, a civilian
politician, was elected the new head of state. In keeping with its Cold War policy of shoring up
anticommunist regimes, the U.S. had supported the Brazilian military government for years. In a
bilateral meeting with President Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1974), U.S. President Richard
Nixon (1969-1974) emphasized that Brazil was in good hands thanks to the country’s economic
staff. In his speech, Garrastazu Médici stressed his faith in a lasting partnership between the two
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countries.1 President Gerald Ford (1974-1977) also viewed Brazil as an indispensable regional
ally.2 The military government’s human rights abuses were little obstacle to a good relationship
with Washington.
As explained by the historian Thomas E. Skidmore, U.S.-Brazilian relations degenerated
considerably when Jimmy Carter won the 1976 presidential election. “President Carter’s
campaign had the pledge to restore transparency and morality to Washington,” he wrote.3
“Considering the military regime’s human rights abuses, it seemed inevitable that (President
Ernesto) Geisel and Carter would butt heads.”4 Scholars like historian William Michael Schmidli
state that the emergence of the human rights movement (by the mid-1970s) was crucial to
promoting Carter’s election, because U.S. public opinion had turned against supporting
right-wing dictatorships not only in Latin America but also in Asia (South Korea) and Africa
(Rhodesia).5 In his inaugural speech, the 39th President of the United States emphasized that “we
can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere”—a quote that inspired Schmidli’s
book title, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, which explored the U.S. Cold War policies towards
Latin America with a focus on Argentina. 6
An analysis regarding the U.S. support for dictatorships around the world comes from
David F. Schmitz, who writes that the promotion of democracy—in opposition to
communism—was not a consistent, central goal of the United States: “the history of supporting

1

Renata Fratton Noronha and Waldemar Dalenogare Neto, “De Brasília a Washington: Relações de Moda e Poder a
partir do encontro Nixon-Medici,” VII Congresso Internacional de História, https://bit.ly/36yLtlG, (Porto Alegre:
XX Semana de História, 2015).
2
Thomas E. Skidmore, “Geisel,” Brazil: Five Centuries of Change,
https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-7/military-rule/geisel/, (Providence: Brown
University Library Center for Digital Scholarship, 2009).
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
William Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy Toward
Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 2.
6
Ibid.
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authoritarian regimes cannot be dismissed or ignored in evaluating American foreign policy
since 1965,” the author states.7 He argues that Jimmy Carter was the first U.S. President ever to
implement a foreign policy based on the promotion of democracy and human rights.8 João
Henrique Roriz, a Brazilian scholar, sees Carter’s election as a “turning point”9 in the
relationship between Washington and Brasília and approaches its repercussions in the diplomatic
field. He says that right after Carter’s victory, a memorandum was sent from the capital of Brazil
to all major Brazilian embassies in Europe and also D.C. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
predicted that the “observed changes in the international political context seem to indicate that
the attention given by the world community to human rights issues would not wane, but instead
experience a possible intensification, which would have implications and repercussions in
multilateral and bilateral forums.”10 Sidnei Munhoz and Francisco Silva, who are also historians
from Brazil, agree with this perspective. Their work approaches the history of Brazil-United
States relations during the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Both argue that the
issue of human rights abroad came to the fore when Carter took office.
However, Munhoz and Silva add that the President’s real goal was to loudly denounce
violations against the human rights of Soviet dissidents. “His credibility, however, required that
the official discourse had to be universalized, embracing all authoritarian governments, even
those of countries which were friends.”11 In his book The Last Utopia, historian Samuel Moyn
stresses that neoconservatives understood Carter’s agenda on human rights as “anticommunism

7

David F. Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 5.
8
Ibid.
9
João Henrique Roriz, “Clashing frames: human rights and foreign policy in the Brazilian re-democratization
process.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Nov 2017), 10.
10
Ibid.
11
Sidnei Munhoz and Francisco Silva, Brazil-United States relations: XX and XXI centuries (Maringá: Eduem,
2013), 208.
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by other name.”.”12 Moyn also mentions the complaints by Noam Chomsky about Carter’s
policies in March 1977. According to the far-left activist and critic, “the human rights campaign
is a device to be manipulated by propagandists to gain popular support for counter-revolutionary
intervention.”.”13
Other authors explore the connection between President Carter and a group of activists
that introduced human rights issues in Latin America to the American audience. According to
historian and Brazilianist James Green, these activities were essential to isolating the military
regime and facilitating the creation of a broader solidarity movement concerned about
democracy in the region during the late 1970s.14 In her book, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and
the National Agenda, political scientist Mary E. Stucey analyzes Carter’s speech at the
University of Notre Dame in 1977 to highlight the president’s connection to the pro-human rights
activists in attendance. On that occasion, the U.S. President received an honorary degree together
with pro-human rights activists from Brazil, South Korea, and Rhodesia (something that will be
explored in the second chapter of this thesis). Stucey further argues that Carter’s foreign policy
encouraged the release of political prisoners not only in Brazil, but also in Indonesia, South
Korea, the Philippines, and Cuba: “under Carter human rights had achieved an unprecedented
level of international attention and acclaim, and that provided at least some impetus for
presidents for presidents to continue some sort of human rights,” she writes.15
This thesis goes beyond the analysis of presidential speeches or connections with activists
before and after the campaign. It calls attention to a debate that describes the pragmatism of
Carter’s administration and how his foreign policy brought risks to DC in its relationship with a
12

Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 157.
Ibid.
14
James Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 346.
15
Mary E. Stuckey, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2008), 133.
13

14
strategic partner in Latin America. This work analyzes how the foreign policies of Jimmy
Carter’s White House resonated internally in Brazil, and how this in turn affected Brasília’s
relationship with Washington.

1.3 Sources, Method, and Outline of Chapters

Since this research aims to explore how the press in the United States and Brazil reported
the political landscape in Brasília and its relationship with President Jimmy Carter's
administration, it will explore the archives of American newspapers and magazines such as The
New York Times (the news organization that won more Pulitzer Prizes), The New Republic
(founded by liberal intellectuals in 1914), The National Review (founded in 1955 as a magazine
of conservative opinion), and The Nation (founded by abolitionists in 1865). These archives are
available through Georgia State University library's virtual databases. Additionally, sources in
Portuguese are available; the major Brazilian newspapers offer free access to their virtual
archives. For the purpose of this thesis, Folha de S. Paulo (which has the largest circulation
currently in the country), O Estado de S. Paulo (the newspaper that has the second-largest
circulation in the city of São Paulo, behind only Folha), and O Globo (the most prominent
publication in the Globo Group media conglomerate, the largest mass media group in Latin
America). The Biblioteca da Presidência da República do Brasil (The Library of the Presidency
of the Republic of Brazil) provides all public statements of President Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979)
and President João Figueiredo (1979-1985). Similarly, President Jimmy Carter's speeches are
preserved in his administration’s public papers.
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Just as this thesis draws on primary sources from the United States and Brazil, it also
references secondary works from both nations. Notably, these include the publications of the
historian James Green, which analyze the connections between Washington DC and Brasília
during the Brazilian military regime (1964-1985). His book, We Cannot Remain Silent:
Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States, for example, is a result of
the author's interviews with many of the activists who educated U.S. journalists, government
officials, and the public opinion about the violence taking place in Brazil. My analysis
contextualizes the insights of Green’s work within the greater landscape of American geopolitics,
as described in historical works such as The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, by
David Schmitz, which examines the U.S. policy towards right-wing dictatorships from 1960 to
the end of the Cold War. This literature is complemented by the work of the Brazilian historians
Francisco Silva and Sidnei Munhoz, Brazil-United States relations: XX and XXI centuries, which
describes how D.C. interacted with Brasília from the 1964 Brazilian coup d’état to the
re-democratization process finalized in 1985. Finally, I attempt to frame my own analysis within
the context of the broader scope of Brazilian social, cultural, political, and economic history, as
traced by Thomas Skidmore in Brazil: Five Centuries of Change.
The thesis consists of this introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter
("The Political Landscape: Before and During the 1976 U.S. Presidential Election”) describes
how the Brazilian and the American media reported Carter's campaign and how they reported the
political environment in Latin America (LATAM) and Brazil during the presidential election and
the transition to the new administration. Continuing the analysis of media coverage, the second
chapter (“The New President and the Relationship with Brasília”) explores President Jimmy
Carter's diplomacy towards Brazil, focusing on the First Lady Rosalynn Carter's visit to the
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South American country in 1977 and the presidential visit to Brasília in the following year. The
last chapter (“The Impact of Carter’s Visit and the Relationship with President Figueiredo”)
analyzes the lasting impact of President Carter's visit in the relationship between the two
countries, tracing how it developed in the years ahead, during the presidency of General João
Figueiredo (1979-1985). It also explores the Brazilian gradual re-democratization process,
including the Amnesty Law (1979), the end of the two-party system, and the Institutional Act
Number Five (the most repressive law of Brazil's regime) and how the White House reacted to
this political landscape in Brasília.
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2 BEFORE AND DURING THE 1976 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

2.1 Summary

This first chapter describes how the Brazilian and American media reacted to Jimmy
Carter’s campaign and his election in 1976 and how they reported the political landscape in Latin
America and Brazil. It shows the pragmatism of the Democratic campaign’s approach to the
issues of human rights that did not necessarily represent the candidate’s or the party’s ideological
agenda. During his gubernatorial campaign in 1970, for example, Carter ran as moderate and was
careful on race-sensitive matters since the subject could affect his candidacy in a Southern
state.16 Beyond that, after his election, the Governor of Georgia met with President Emilio
Médici in 1972, the third head of state of the Brazilian military, and did not share statements of
concern regarding human rights in his trip to Brazil.17
As it is possible to learn through articles published by the American press throughout the
presidential elections in 1976, the verbal attacks of the Democratic campaign in 1976 against
Brasília had the goal of pleasing both liberal and conservative voters. The first ones were
interested in the fight for human rights around the globe, while the second group was seeking
stability in a country that had an unpopular government among its citizens at that point. The
reaction in Brazil to such rhetoric, and to the policies that followed from it, however, were not
what the Carter administration expected. The regime’s leaders sought support outside of U.S.
influence—as seen in its nuclear agreement with West Germany—and defied the United States
by supporting the new Soviet-backed administration in Angola established in 1975.
16
17

O Globo, “A discreta passagem por Brasília em 72,” November 4, 1976, 2.
Ibid.
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2.2 The USA’s landscape and its Relationship with Latin America

In the 1976 U.S. presidential election, neither of the candidates had been elected
president before. The Republican head of state, Gerald R. Ford, lacked enthusiastic support from
his party establishment and was associated in voters’ minds with the Watergate scandal.18 Ford
was not perceived as dishonest or corrupt himself, but he could not escape the taint of his
association with former President Richard M. Nixon.19 His campaign was also weakened in the
primary by a challenge from the former Governor of California, Ronald Reagan (1967-1975),
who would be elected president four years later. Considering that the nation was fatigued with
Watergate and its repercussions, voters were seeking a clean break with the past. As explained by
Paul Christiansen, Associated Professor at Setton Hall University’s College of Communication
and the Arts, who analyzed the Democratic Party’s campaign ads of that year for his book
Orchestrating Public Opinion: How Music Persuades in Television Political Ads for U.S.
Presidential Campaigns, “since Ford was so intimately connected with Nixon’s scandal—despite
widespread voter opinion that Ford himself was uninvolved—many people wanted to vote for
change.”20 Prior to his presidential bid, Carter’s public service experience included a stint in the
U.S. Navy, two senate terms in the Georgia General Assembly, and one term as governor of
Georgia (1971-1975).21 Foreign affairs were a difficult subject during Carter’s candidacy. It was
challenging for the Democratic Party in 1976 to criticize the Republicans, who had ended the
war in Vietnam and were pursuing détente with the Soviet Union and a new relationship with
18

Paul Christiansen, Orchestrating Public Opinion: How Music Persuades in Television Political Ads for US
Presidential Campaigns, 1952–2016 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018). Accessed January 10, 2021.
doi:10.2307/j.ctv8pzcv5.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Gary M. Fink, The New Georgia Encyclopedia Companion to Georgia Literature, edited by Hugh Ruppersburg
and John C. Inscoe (University of Georgia Press, 2007), 68.
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China. Carter was generally in favor of those policies.22 The historian Gary Fink highlights that
the Democrat politician ended up with a strategy that would criticize the Nixon-Ford
administration for its neglect of human rights and for its support for dictatorial regimes in Chile
and on the Indian sub-continent.23 “Human rights were an ideal issue for candidate Carter. It
united a political party that, at that time, included both conservative cold warriors and liberal
anti-war candidates”, he writes.24
This electoral strategy seemed to be correct since the debate around Latin American
dictatorships’ violations of human rights was being discussed by the U.S. press throughout the
1970s. In March 1976, The New Republic magazine published an article about Chile’s
prize-winning boy scout, Pedro Huertas, a 20-year-old with no political connections or charges
against him “who was subject to a range of torture in places like Chile, Uruguay and Brazil.”.”25
Like other young people of his age, he was involved with politics at a grassroots
level—community centers, student and faculty groups—and was a supporter of Chile’s left-wing
former President Salvador Allende. Right after a speech by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) on
the floor of the Senate, in which the legislator asked why Huertas’s exile request to the U.S. was
still pending approval from the American government, the young activist was taken from prison
in his country and put on a plane to California.26 The same article also mentions that Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger had suggested setting up a committee to study the nature and extent of
torture in the world, and then United Nations Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan asked for
amnesty for political prisoners everywhere. Nine months later, another article by The New
Republic’s columnist John Hersey criticized the American “business morality” that tainted the
22

Ibid, 68.
Ibid.
24
Ibid, 69.
25
Rose Styron,“America’s Repressive Ally: Torture in Chile,” The New Republic, March 20, 1976, 15-17.
26
Ibid.
23
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country’s pretensions to concern for racial and economic justice and for peace. “I need only
mention the interests of corporations in such resources as the gold, chrome and asbestos of
Rhodesia; the manganese, copper, antimony, nickel, tin and uranium of South Africa; the nitrates
and cooper of Chile; the oil of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Venezuela”, he wrote.27 “These
business interests have directly affected our policies on apartheid, the Palestinians, Israel, Latin
American dictatorships”, the author concluded.28
Among conservative voters, the idea of criticizing Latin American dictatorships was also
appropriate since some governments in the region had adopted an independent foreign policy
that was out of U.S. control. The importance of having a stabilized LATAM under Washington’s
influence had to do with economic reasons. As explained by the President of the Inter-American
Development Bank, Ortiz Mena (1971-1988), the Latin-American countries “were a positive
factor”29 in the economic push of the United States in the second half of the 1970s. From 1972 to
1975, the U.S. increased its exports to LATAM from US$ 6 billion to US$ 18 billion annually.30
In its approach to the apprehensions concerning the relationship between the United States and
LATAM, the conservative magazine National Review mentioned the concern regarding Cuban
and Soviet influence in the region. On that matter, the publication accused the right-wing
Venezuelan government of being “cocky, perhaps even complacent about the threat of Caribbean
Communism.”.”31 The reason why the article criticized (and expected more from) Caracas had to
do with the fact that former Venezuelan President Romulo Bettancour was nominated by the
magazine as the political godfather of President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979).32 The

27

John Hersey, “An Inaugural Address,” The New Republic, December 11, 1976, 17-19.
Ibid.
29
Folha de S. Paulo, “Carter e a América Latina,” November 4, 1976, 2.
30
Ibid.
31
National Review, “Venezuela Looks Around,” November 11, 1976, 1307.
32
Ibid.
28
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National Review presented Bettancourt as the South-American leader who was “substantially”33
responsible for the boycott of Fidel Castro (Cubas’s Prime Minister) by the Organization of
American States in 1962. “If Fidel Castro, financed by the Soviet Union, (begins) to extend his
empire, for instance into Jamaica, and then hopscotch his way east along the Caribbean... would
Venezuela (react to that)?”, it asked.34
Even Brazil’s behavior and its relationship with Cuba worried the U.S. State Department.
In another article published by The Nation in March 1976, the magazine discussed Brazil’s
recognition of the Cuban and Soviet backed MPLA—the People’s Movement for the Liberation
of Angola—as the effective government of the African country in the previous year.35 The Nation
stated that President Ford’s foreign policy towards that country was weakening U.S. influence in
Brasília. “The capering friendliness displayed by Secretary of State Kissinger during his late
February visit with the despotic ruler of Brazil may have seemed excessive to Americans who
have not followed closely recent Brazilian moves on the stage of world affairs”, the publication
highlighted.36 “The fact is that Latin America’s largest, most populous and richest country, whose
loyal cooperation Washington has long taken for granted, has shown a disconcerting willingness
to follow an independent, if antagonistic, course.”.”37 The same article mentioned a study by
Stanford University and the American Enterprise for Public Policy Research that urged the
United States, Japan, and Western Europe to “integrate Brazil into the developed neo-capitalist
Atlantic community.”.”38 According to the study, future Brazilian administrations might decide
that the “dubious value of Third World leadership is worth more than a junior partnership in the

33

Ibid.
Ibid.
35
Elizabeth Farnsworth and Nancy Stein, “Brazil Leaves Out Orbit,” The Nation, March 13, 1976, 294.
36
Ibid, 294.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid, 295.
34
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Euro-American club.”.”39 The magazine wrapped up the article by stating that “Brazil’s Angola
policy is a step in this direction.”.”40 Beyond the support to MPLA, the publication added that the
Brazilian government voted with the Arabs in the United Nations to condemn Zionism as a form
of racism, and it signed a US$ 4 billion nuclear power deal with West Germany, which
eventually gave Brazilian military regime a nuclear capability.41
In raising the Brazilian nuclear issue, The Nation touched a sensitive issue concerning the
Brazilian diplomatic strategy that became a priority after the 1964 military coup d’état in the face
of the energy needs of the national development project and the potential exhaustion of water
resources.42 Both Presidents Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Costa e Silva (1967-1969) brought
this issue to their agendas.43 The following head of state, President Emílio Médici (1964-1979),
pushed the issue to the fore through the creation of Nuclebrás, mapping out a plan which took
into account future energy needs and planning for the construction of hydroelectric plants.44
Then, President Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) viewed the acquisition of nuclear technology as an
important symbol of Brazil’s growing global profile and argued that in order to meet the
country’s rising energy demand Brazil needed nuclear power.45
The Brazilianist and historian Thomas Skidmore explains that “although the United
States admitted Brazil’s need for increased energy capacity, Washington countered that the
ability to generate nuclear power would allow the military regime to produce nuclear weapons,
which the United States could not permit.”.”46 Despite the fact that Brazil received reactors from

39

Ibid.
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Sidnei Munhoz and Francisco Silva, Brazil-United States relations: XX and XXI centuries (Maringá: Eduem,
2013), 205.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Skidmore, https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-7/military-rule/geisel/.
46
Ibid.
40
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Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1974, an American manufacturing company, the USA
Commission for Atomic Energy vetoed the supply of fuel—an action that was in line with the
new non-proliferation posture of the American government.47 The Brazilian scholars Sidnei
Munhoz and Francisco Silva underscore that it was within this scenario that the Brazil-Germany
Agreement came about, as the European country was also seeking to increase its autonomy from
the USA (guaranteeing access to uranium mines and providing new markets for German
products).48 “During the Ford-Kissinger administration, pressure was exerted in a very careful
and cordial way. Washington still saw Brazil as a necessary and preferential ally in Latin
America”, the authors state. As they discuss the U.S. Secretary of State’s trip to Brasília in
February 1976 and the fact that both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on that
occasion which established bilateral consultative meetings across a range of issues, Munoz and
Silva write that this diplomatic initiative “had much more symbolic significance than actually
providing any concrete results” relating to the attempt to contain the Brazilian nuclear
development.49 The diplomatic tension, therefore, was up in the air. The dissatisfaction with the
decisions of the Brazilian government came from conservative and liberal voters—an avenue of
electoral opportunities for Carter’s candidacy.

2.3 The Brazilian Political Landscape

The historian David Schmitz provides a sophisticated reading of the U.S. support for the
Latin American dictatorships of the 1960s, most of which had started under good relations with
Washington, including the Brazilian one (established in 1964). “In order to protect American
47

Munhoz and Silva, 205.
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
48
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investments and prevent any further political deterioration, it was imperative that order be
maintained and the support for military governments remained central to American policy,” he
writes in his book The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships.50 The scholar also mentions
a Memorandum by the U.S. Department of State prepared in December 1970 concerning the
American approach towards Brasília. The document pointed out that, while the government of
General Castello Branco (1964-1967)—the first head of state of the Brazilian military
regime—was criticized by Congress and the American press due to its “repressive aspects,”51 the
idea of supporting authoritarian regimes was nonetheless “warranted”52 since “Brazil was stable,
provided a safe environment for investments and trade, and was actively working against
communism in South America.”.” 53
However, throughout the 1970s, some aspects of Brazil’s international policy, its nuclear
strategy—as discussed previously—and the economic and political decline of its dictatorship
pushed Washington to rethink its relationship with Brazil. An article by The New York Times in
September 1976 registered that—“two years after soaring petroleum prices and the world
recession brought Brazil’s ‘economic miracle’ to an end”—the country was moving toward a
new model of development.54 The newspaper stated that the emerging patterns included a greater
role for the state in the economy, a new emphasis on Brazilian-made products to replace imports,
and a slower rate of growth during the next few years.55 It also added that the military
government’s shift in the economy has “provoked intense criticism from businessmen, who have
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been the strongest civilian supporters of the revolution declared by the armed forces” in 1964.56
Together with the economic issue, the continuation of repression against political activists
encouraged civil society to remobilize. During President Ernesto Geisel’s administration
(1974-1979), influential civil organizations such as the Brazilian Legal Association and the
Brazilian Press Association joined church leaders, student groups, and union organizers in
demanding democratic reforms.57 Skidmore highlights that, “faced with such a diverse,
widespread, and committed opposition, Geisel needed to embrace the inevitability of
liberalization, revert to the high levels of repression that characterized (Emílio) Médici
presidency (1969-1974), or risk losing control of the democratization process.”.”58
When he took office in March 1974, President Geisel had stated that his administration
would make efforts to promote a “gradual democratic improvement” with the “greater general
participation of the responsible elites and the people.”.”59 Eight months after this presidential
speech, the military regime promoted the most open elections since 1965 but was shocked by the
outcome. Senate candidates from the opposition were allowed to campaign on television and
radio. “Granted the opportunity to disseminate a party platform, opposition candidates wisely
transformed the election into a symbolic plebiscite about the military rule,” Skidmore
describes.60 “On election day, most military endorsed candidates lost, and Geisel was reminded
of his disdain for the Brazilian public’s voting tendencies.”61 As the President realized he would
have difficulties maintaining power under his liberalization plan, his government reversed the
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initiatives that were established before the general elections. Geisel closed the National Congress
and issued a bill (Lei Falcão) that ended opposition candidates’ right to campaign and broadcast
over radio.62
Beyond that, the continuity of the prosecution against pro-democracy activists mobilized,
even more, the forces that opposed the military government.63 The most representative landmark
was the death of Vladimir Herzog—the director of journalism of TV Cultura, the state of São
Paulo’s public television station—that happened one year before. In October 1975, he voluntarily
presented himself for questioning about his alleged links to the Brazilian Communist Party
(PCB) at the Department of Information Operations—Center for Internal Defense Operations
(DOI-CODI), the Brazilian intelligence and political repression agency.64 Twelve hours after his
arrival to the building, the police announced he had hanged himself with a piece of cloth from
the window bars of the police cell where he had been detained.65 “No one who knew Vladimir
thought he had killed himself”, James Green writes in his book, We Cannot Remain Silent:
Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States.66
As a consequence of the journalist’s death, “a rejuvenated student movement headed by a
new generation of activists led 30,000 university students and professors in a weeklong strike,”
Green explains.67 He adds that the journalists’ union remained in permanent session in protest
against the military’s measures, and forty-two bishops signed a statement against the state’s
violence, events that Green calls “a turning point in unifying opposition to the military regime.”68
As a consequence of the empowerment of the groups against the government, the main
62

L6339, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/1970-1979/l6339.htm.
Ibid.
64
Green, 332.
65
Ibid, 330.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid, 331.
68
Ibid, 331.
63

27
opposition party (MDB—the Brazilian Democratic Movement) won control of municipal
councils in the country’s largest cities in the November 1976 elections.69 The democratic siege of
the dictatorship was continually increasing.

2.4 Jimmy Carter: Governor, Candidate and President

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and former President Jimmy Carter are the only two citizens
of the state of Georgia to have won the Nobel Peace Prize. While the Democrat’s political career
was taking off, the Baptist preacher had a national and international audience for his speeches
and sermons. However, Carter never appeared in public together with Dr. King.70 As explained
by Robert Strong, a specialist in the history of Georgia, a photograph of a politician in the 1960s
standing next to the Civil Rights leader would have made a statement about where that politician
stood on issues that were highly controversial in electoral behavior.71 “Carter avoided such
statements until after he was elected Governor,” Strong argues. “He came to play his public part
in the cause of civil rights on his own terms and on his own timetable.”72 In addition, the scholar
explains that the Democrat ran as a moderate and was particularly careful on race-sensitive
matters during his gubernatorial campaign in 1970.73 As a candidate, he promised to invite
George Wallace, the Governor of Alabama and the infamous opponent of efforts to allow black
students to attend the state university, to visit Georgia.74
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After his election as governor, Carter visited Brazil in 1972 and met with the third
president of the military regime, General Emílio Médici. On that occasion, the Brazilian
newspaper O Globo observed that Carter stated that “Brazil was becoming more and more a
brother of the continent.”.”75 The Governor also told the press that he had given Médici a picture
by a Georgian painter that shows a growing tree, “to symbolize the growth of Brazil,”76 and that
he requested the opening of a Brazilian consulate in Georgia. No word of criticism against the
dictatorship was shared publicly during the gubernatorial trip.77
As the Democratic candidate for President of the United States in 1976, Jimmy Carter
mentioned Brazil once during the three presidential debates with his Republican opponent. He
addressed the nuclear issue and the Brazilian agreement with West Germany. Carter said that the
U.S. government should stop the sale (that was conducted by Bonn) of “processing plants for
Brazil.”.”78 He continued by saying that, “if we continue under Mr. Ford’s policy, by 1985 or ‘90
we’ll have twenty nations that have the capability of exploding atomic weapons. This has got to
be stopped.”.”79 In its coverage of the debate, The New York Times pointed out that the subject
was brought to the conversation by the Democrat, and he charged that President Ford “had only
recently become concerned about the problem.”80 The same newspaper stated that—in an address
to the San Diego City Club in September—Carter promised that he would call on all nations to
accept a “voluntary moratorium”81 on the sale or purchase of nuclear fuel enrichment or
reprocessing plants. The candidate said that such a moratorium “should apply retroactively”82 to
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agreements already made by West Germany to sell such facilities to Brazil and France and to
supply Pakistan with such technology.
Right after the end of the presidential campaign, the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.
Paulo interviewed members of Brazil’s diplomatic body who admitted—anonymously—that the
Democrat’s administration would promote “verbal skirmishes” between the White House and the
military regime.83 In a conversation with Brazilian journalists, the spokesperson of the U.S.
Embassy in Brasília minimized the impact of the President-Elect’s interview to Playboy
magazine that was published in November, the election month.84 Carter said that Brazil did not
have a democratic government but a military dictatorship that was “highly repressive toward
political prisoners.”85 The American diplomat emphasized that those statements were delivered
by a candidate and not a President. The spokesman also mentioned that, actually, the Democrat
was just criticizing the foreign-policy developed by Ford’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.
The Brazilian press and opinion-makers received Carter’s critiques of human rights
violations with skepticism. Experts in global commerce that were interviewed by O Globo said
that the remarks of the future President represented “a political strategy to please part of the
American voters.”86 Beyond that, in an editorial article, Folha de S. Paulo stated that Carter’s
liberalizing pressure was “not motivated by democratic principles, but by the fear of the
emergence of regimes such as General Velasco Alvarado’s (Peru’s former left-wing military
president) in crucial countries to the American global strategy.”.”87 It is not a coincidence that the
Peruvian government was mentioned since President Geisel was scheduled to meet with the
President of Peru and Velasco Alvarado’s successor, Morales Bermúdez, in November to discuss
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and implement strategies to increase the bilateral commerce between both nations.88 Even with
the fact that Morales was considered less radical and dogmatic than his predecessor by U.S.
diplomats,89 the eyes of Washington were still in Lima since Granma, the official Cuban
newspaper, said that “the designation of General Morales Bermudez might mean the
consolidation of the progressive advances of the Peruvian revolutionary process.”90 According to
the Brazilian media, therefore, Carter’s concern about human rights and nuclear proliferation had
the goal of satisfying the American economic interests and the will of keeping its influence in the
region—since the Brazilian military regime was suffering from its own economic and political
decline and was facing a growing and organized opposition. No wonder Geisel said again to the
press that his government was committed to the improvement of Brazilian democracy on the
same day that Jimmy Carter became the President-Elect of the United States. “(This commitment
must) start with the participation of the people in the political framework,”91 Geisel said. It was
an indication that his administration would proceed with its liberalization plans—plans that
would culminate with the return of the civilians to the government in the following decade.
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3 THE NEW PRESIDENT AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH BRASÍLIA

3.1 Summary

This chapter approaches the first two years of Jimmy Carter's presidency and the
relationship of his government with Brazil. A close reading of the sources reveals that the White
House took a pragmatic approach to Brazil, and that Carter’s foreign policy was ultimately
shaped by a confluence of different interest groups and agendas. Ultimately, this mix of
constituencies forced the American government to give up its pro-human rights discourse in
order to stay connected with its Brazilian interlocutors in the regime as well as in the opposition.
One important pressure group was U.S. capital; American multinationals were concerned about
the way the military regime was conducting the economy, and U.S. bankers held $12 billion of
Brazilian debt.92 Essential and attractive industries (such as oil and energy) were in the hands of
the Brazilian government, and multinationals and bankers alike pressured Carter to maintain
stable relations with Brazil. Those relations—already strained by pro-human rights actions on the
part of the U.S. Congress—were further threatened when, without prior consultation with
President Geisel, Carter sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to West Germany to negotiate the
end of the nuclear agreement with Brazil, an ultimately unsuccessful act that both the Brazilian
regime and its opponents saw as a violation of national sovereignty. The regime was further
irritated by the First Lady's visit to Brasília in 1978 due to the way Mrs. Carter interacted with
opposition leaders. The South American country reacted by canceling a military agreement with
D.C. which was signed in 1952. Thus, a complex set of political and economic interests
pressured President Carter to shore up D.C.’s relationship with the Latin American nation by
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softening his stances on both the nuclear issue and on human rights. The presidential visit to
Brasilia in 1978 demonstrates that the White House accepted such a pragmatic approach, since
there were no attacks against the Brazilian government on either of these critical issues.

3.2 Carter Takes Office

In the months before Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, U.S. legislators added the Harkin
amendment to the 1976 foreign aid bill. The decision gave Congress the power to limit U.S.
economic assistance to “any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.”93 The amendment also required the State Department
to prepare a report about the state of human rights in all counties receiving military aid from the
American government. The revelations about Brasília created undesirable publicity for the
military regime. Skidmore explains that, rather than answering the State Department, President
Geisel “relied on nationalist sentiment in Brazil, portrayed the report as an incursion on Brazilian
sovereignty, and rejected further military aid from the United States.”94 With the new President in
the Oval Office, the White House increased diplomatic pressure on the Brazilian regime. In
January 1977, Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Bonn to persuade West Germany to
cancel the 1975 nuclear agreement with Brazil—a mission that ended unsuccessfully.95 Brasília
was angered by the American policy of ignoring Brazil and talking directly to the West
Germans.96 As a response, two months after the vice presidential trip, Geisel decided to cancel a
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Brazilian military agreement with D.C., which had been signed in 1952. At that point, as it will
be explored later in this chapter, even the most progressive politicians and pro-human rights
sectors in Brazil started to support the discourse of the military government around the country's
sovereignty against American interference. 97
In the first months of his administration, President Carter’s speeches also contributed to
amplifying the tension between the United States and military dictatorships in LATAM. In April,
as he addressed Latin American diplomats at the Organization of American States (OAS), the
President made a strong defense of his emphasis on human rights on foreign affairs and asked the
region to halt the spread of nuclear facilities that could be used to produce weapons.98 In a
commencement ceremony in the following month at the University of Notre Dame, Carter
received an honorary degree together with three pro-human rights Catholic activists, Cardinal
Kim Sou-hwan (South Korea), Bishop Donal Lamont (Rhodesia), and Cardinal Paulo Evaristo
Arns (Brazil). The last one was a relentless opponent of the Brazilian dictatorship and its use of
torture. “In their fights for human freedoms in Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Korea, these three
religious leaders typify all that is best in our countries and in our church,” the U.S. head of state
said.99 Although this kind of discourse helped to elect the Democratic candidate and pleased
conservatives and liberals, the extent of this rhetoric and President Geisel’s potentially adverse
reactions worried the American sectors that had economic interests in Brazil. Public commentary
on the Brazilian economy showed a mix of praise and concern. For example, a piece in The New
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Republic highlighted that Brazil’s Gross National Product (GNP) was expected to grow by nine
percent in 1977.100 However, it cautioned that “almost everybody seems to be tired of the way the
economy is run in Brazil,” adding that “Brazil’s external debt now stands at $27 billion, the
highest in the world. This does not seem to bother either the government, which is prepared to
see it go up to $40 billion by 1980, or the American bankers who hold $12 billion of the debt.”101
American companies were also concerned about the way Brasília was taking control of
essential and attractive national industries. “State enterprises (are) running everything from the
national power supply—Electrobras—to much of the steel industry (Vale do Rio Doce). This is
state capitalism at its extreme in a country that professes its allegiance to free enterprise,” The
New Republic reported. The conservative magazine National Review wrote that President
Carter’s statements generated a “flurry of irritated reactions abroad” and caused “Brazil, the most
powerful nation in Latin America, to cancel its 25-year mutual defense treaty with the U.S..”.”102
The pressure towards the American President to review the relationship with Brasília came not
only from the private sector but also from the White House staff. The National Security Advisor,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, warned President Carter that the human rights initiative, combined with the
administration’s interest in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, could produce a backlash in
some Latin American countries, prompting a coalition of Latin American countries against the
White House.103 Brzezinski cautioned the President that the White House risked “having bad
relations simultaneously with Brazil, Chile, and Argentina because of the way (the country) was
implementing our human-rights policy.”104 The National Review pointed out that there was a
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particular concern with U.S.-Brazil relations because of their “strategic importance to the United
States.”105 In that scenario, though, when President Carter tried to establish a platform of
dialogue between the two nations, his administration's policies ended up promoting more
tension. By the time that D.C. set up the First Lady's trip to Brazil in order to meet President
Geisel and local official representatives, the U.S. President signed the treaty establishing Latin
America as the world's first nuclear-weapons-free zone four days before her trip in June 1977
and signed the American Convention on Human Rights—a measure that Brazil resented as
another interference in its domestic affairs.106

3.3 The First Lady’s Visit and its Impact on U.S-Brazil Relations
Thomas Skidmore characterizes Rosalynn Carter’s visit to Brazil as “an attempt at
reconciliation107.”.” According to the First Lady’s own words, her mission was “to try to ease the
tension between our countries by explaining Carter’s policies on human rights, nuclear
non-proliferation, and the arms race108.”.” However, the ambiguous decisions of D.C. around the
trip—as the American administration tried both to please the government and to establish
connections with the local opposition—gave room for more tension and disagreement. First of
all, the White House informed the press that Rosalynn Carter, in a phone call with President
Carter prior to her arrival in Brazil, said that specific stop “would be one of the hardest ones in
her trip to Latin America109 (which also included Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia,
and Venezuela)” as she approached the tension between both countries regarding issues such as
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the Brazilian nuclear agreement with West Germany.110 Beyond that, the U.S. Embassy in
Brasília announced that it would not block any correspondence directed to Mrs. Carter from any
opposition group.111 While Rosalynn Carter’s first speech in Brazil said that the United States
respected the sovereignty of each country in the hemisphere, she stressed that the American
approach to Latin American would be based on “a fundamental and sincere commitment to
human rights.”.”112 Diplomatic circles in Brasília considered as “thought-provoking”113 the fact
that the First Lady invited leaders of the opposition in the Congress to join her for dinner in the
residence of the U.S. Ambassador John Crimmins. According to the official protocol, as
explained by the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo, Mrs. Carter could only invite the
Presidents of both legislative houses (the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate). In this
case, the event would have representatives from the regime's official party, the National Renewal
Alliance (ARENA), exclusively.114 However, Rosalynn Carter invited opposition members to the
reception.
On the following day, events between President Ernesto Geisel and the American First
Lady included an exchange of gifts, a dinner at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the presentation of a sympathy card due to the death of the President’s sister-in-law,
Alzira Geisel.115 In a press conference in Brasília, Mrs. Carter confirmed that she addressed
topics such as the nuclear issue (“a pretty difficult subject”116) and human rights (“each country
has a different approach to that”) in her conversation with Brazilian officials. However, the First
Lady’s statements to the local media avoided any direct criticism against the local government.
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Moreover, on that occasion, she was asked about anti-American sentiments in the region. A
journalist told her that the White House's pro-human rights agenda was considered “by many in
the Third World to be an excuse for economic domination of poor nations by rich countries117.”.”
Her response emphasized that the “issue of human rights encompasses economic
development118.”.” Another questioner stressed that there were “many people here in Latin
American who think that Carter’s government119” was “practicing a very selective morality on
human rights, being concerned about violations in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, but without
saying a word about Marxist countries like Cambodia, Vietnam and Cuba120.” Rosalynn Carter
answered that decisions around this matter should be taken according to local realities.
Before traveling from Brasília to Recife for private appointments in the Northeastern city,
the First Lady received letters from activists such as the President of Women’s Movement
Pro-Amnesty, Teresinha Godoy Zerbini, who asked her to share with America the fight of
Brazilian women for human rights.121 Another message that was delivered to Rosalynn Carter
came from family members of political prisoners. The report contained the names of 129 people
detained and convicted for political reasons, who were in jail or missing.122 O Estado de S. Paulo
wrote that Brazilian authorities breathed with relief as soon as the First Lady left Brasília.123
Despite the apparent calm in the interaction with officials, Mrs. Carter’s stay was considered to
be full of “embarrassing incidents124.” The same newspaper stated that the human rights agenda
interested her more than the First Lady’s scheduled conversations. Even President Carter’s
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expected invitation for President Geisel to visit the United States was not brought by his
wife—as confirmed by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Azeredo da Silveira. 125.
In Recife, Rosalynn Carter broke with her itinerary and invited Thomas Capuano and the
Reverend Lawrence Rosebaugh, two American missionaries working with the city’s urban poor,
to the U.S. Consulate.126 The local police had arrested the religious workers and beaten them up
while in jail. Regarding this episode, the historian James Green explains that the photos of the
First Lady talking to the man was a signal to the Brazilian government and the opposition that
the Carter administration was serious about its human rights initiatives.127 “I have listened to
their experiences, and I sympathize with them,”128 Mrs. Carter said according to The New York
Times after the 15-minute meeting at the American Consulate. “I have a personal message to take
back to Jimmy,” she concluded.129 When the Brazilian Foreign Minister was asked about the
incident and the letters received by President Carter’s wife, Azeredo da Silveira provoked D.C.
by remembering the death of two men by the police during a Puerto Rican demonstration in
Chicago in the previous week.130 “(Connecting the Brazilian government to the episode in Recife
and the situations reported by the letters) would be like saying that the American people and
government are responsible for the incidents in Chicago. We must consider this as an internal
matter of the United States”, Silveira stated.131

3.4 President Carter’s Visit in 1978
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The impact of the First Lady’s visit to Brazil affected the way that the Department of
State later negotiated the relationship with the South American country. President Carter’s
planners came to the conclusion that gratuitous provocations should be minimized or avoided.132
As a result of this new strategy, a presidential visit to Brazil in 1978 was designed to soften
conflicts with the government. Rosalynn Carter’s schedule did not include any events with
high-level representatives and the press, for example.133 The New York Times defined the
presidential trip as an American gesture of conciliation with Brasília134 since the political
landscape in Latin America was not favorable to D.C. in 1978. Brazilian Foreign Minister
Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira had said on television and in newspapers that Carter had
invited himself to visit Brazil and the preparations for the arrival of the American head of state
were a matter of duty rather than a wish.135 Beyond that, President Geisel told CBS that the
pro-human rights policy was “fair, reasonable, necessary,136” but the Brazilian government would
not accept any interference.137
Despite the promises on his inauguration regarding an effort to promote democracy,
President Geisel had strengthened the power of the regime against the opposition as a reaction to
the results of the congressional elections in 1974. Four years later, the 21 state governors were
chosen by state electoral colleges where ARENA—Geisel’s party—had the control. One-third of
the Federal Senate was picked by the same colleges, assuring that the majority were from the
regime’s official party.138 Describing this scenario, The New Republic defined Brazil as “a
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one-party state139.” The Brazilian return to democracy—which seemed to be close during the
U.S. presidential elections—would not happen so fast, and the White House needed to
reestablish its partnership with the current government.
Even the relationship with the opposition had to be reshaped, since this group was
uncomfortable with the idea of any American attempt to interfere in local politics. Congressman
Tancredo Neves, who would become the first civilian to be elected President of Brazil after the
end of the dictatorship in 1985, condemned any prospective interference by President Carter in
his upcoming visit to Brasília. “Since we practice the principle of self-determination, we want to
be respected,” the politician stated.140 Other oppositionists interviewed by Folha de S. Paulo
criticized the U.S. pro-human rights policy by saying that the American President represented a
country that made the very weapons used to kill people and violate human rights.141 Even the
Brazilian press had its issues with the White House. Upon Carter 's arrival in Brasília in March
1978, O Estado de S. Paulo published an article by its correspondent in D.C., Ruy Castro, in
which the author criticized the way that the White House was treating international journalists.
“An exclusive interview with the inaccessible U.S. National Security Advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, would be only given if the White House was allowed to censor the material. O
Estado de S. Paulo gave up the interview,” Castro stated.142 “[This episode shows] the respect
that President Jimmy Carter’s xenophobic advisors have for representatives of the foreign press.
Since he took office, the U.S. President answered questions from foreign journalists during his
press conferences on two occasions only,” he added.143
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Among young activists, there was also skepticism regarding the pro-human rights policy.
By the time Carter was traveling to Brazil, around 300 students from the University of Brasília
had approved a motion against the presidential visit and accused the Democrat of being the
“most notable representative of the imperialism that killed, through murderous dictatorships, not
only in Brazil, but in several other countries in the Third World.”144 The event was filmed by
American television stations such as NBC, ABC, and CBS and reported by Time Magazine and
the Associated Press. 145
The President, therefore, needed to manage the anger of both those in power and
pro-democracy groups in Brazil. The White House could not irritate the military regime in the
same way that the First Lady’s visit did in the previous year. The pro-human rights discourse had
closed doors, and the American government was at risk of losing its connections in the wealthiest
country in the region. As highlighted by James Green, the State Department’s moves around
Brazil issued a message that President Carter took the country’s emergent role as an international
power seriously.146 On the other hand, the U.S. government was aware of the importance of
pleasing the opposition since their success would benefit the United States. “A democratic
Brazil, with free elections, is interesting to Washington D.C.,” O Estado de S. Paulo stated.147
The newspaper stressed that the Brazilian political opening would be convenient for American
companies with businesses in the country. While authoritarian regimes tend to “adopt nationalist
policies,”148 the implementation of liberal democracy would “guarantee the stability of foreign
investments.”149 “It is clear”, the publication concluded, “that such a scenario (a democratic
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Brazil) is interesting to the Democratic Party and Jimmy Carter much more due to economic
reasons than the (success of the) Brazilian destiny.”150
The pragmatism of the American government could be seen before the President’s arrival
in Brazil. Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silva announced that Carter had requested a meeting with
the chief of the National Information Service (SNI) and the regime’s official presidential
candidate, General João Baptista Figueiredo—something that was confirmed by the U.S.
Embassy in Brazil.151 As soon as Air Force One arrived in Brasília, Carter pleased his guests by
emphasizing Brazil’s “vision, energy, and creativity of a big power.”152 Based on this presidential
statement, O Estado de S. Paulo wrote that it was clear that the United States wanted this new
power at its side.153 At that point, as the newspaper emphasized, the U.S. was aware of the fact
that Brazil represented “the eighth largest economy in the world, one of the highest rates of
international growth, the fifth largest nation by area, and the sixth-largest one by population.”154
Even the discussion around the nuclear agreement with West Germany was softened by President
Carter. The Democrat told the Brazilian press that the peaceful use of atomic energy “was not
incompatible” with the fight to prevent nuclear proliferation.155
In his statements, while in Brasília, the American head of state maintained a discreet
behavior regarding the debate concerning freedoms and nuclear issues. Carter’s speech in the
National Congress mentioned the pro-human rights policy without focusing on issues such as
torture or political freedom.156 While the U.S. President urged the Brazilian representatives to the
importance of the “basic rights of the human person” and “the right to criticize the government”,
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he also added—right after—“the right to have access to good education, housing, and health
care.”157
The front page of the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo, after the bilateral meeting between
President Carter and President Geisel, stated that the American “gave up his pressures” and,
because of that, there was a euphoric feeling among officials in Brasília.158 The New York Times
reported that the visit ended in a conciliatory climate that had pleasantly surprised the military
government and opened the way to an improvement in relations.159 On that occasion, Foreign
Minister Azeredo da Silveira said that both Presidents got to the point of understanding each
other's positions and “that can be considered a move forward.”160 A communiqué issued by both
Presidents at the end of the conversation pointed to the “need to minimize the inevitable
differences161” of increasingly complex relations—a clear gesture of conciliation of the United
States as interpreted by analysts interviewed by the New York Times.162 The White House also
made sure to establish connections with the opposition, but in a different way considering the
First Lady’s previous experience in Latin America. The President had a single session with
Cardinal Arns, who had received an honorary degree together with Jimmy Carter at Notre Dame
University in 1977; Raymundo Faoro, the President of the Brazilian Legal Association; Júlio
Mesquita, the publisher of O Estado de S. Paulo; José Mindlin, a prominent businessman from
the state of São Paulo; and Marcos Vianna, the president of a state-owned bank.163 James Green
explains that this meeting sent a clear message that the White House shared the concerns of
many oppositional forces.164 The conversation with such opposition leaders was not identified on
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the President’s official schedule to avoid any conflicts with the regime.165 In order to reestablish
the relationship with its Brazilian interlocutors, Carter set his human rights agenda aside.

4. THE IMPACT OF CARTER’S VISIT AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH FIGUEIREDO

4.1 Summary

This chapter discusses the immediate impacts of President Jimmy Carter’s visit to
Brasília in 1978 and his relationship with President João Figueiredo (1979-1985). The new tone
of the U.S. government regarding the Brazilian military regime had not been enough to change
Geisel’s attitude towards the White House. The Brazilian President rejected an official invitation
to visit Washington DC. In March 1979, when General João Figueiredo took office as the new
head of state, Carter sent his Vice President Walter Mondale to visit Brasília just one week after
the inauguration. The American VP did not approach human rights issues in the conversation
with President Figueiredo and took the opportunity to indicate that the White House would not
demand “automatic alignment”166 with the U.S. foreign policy. However, the new Brazilian head
of state was not engaged with the idea of strengthening his relationship with Carter’s
administration. In the period after Mondale’s visit, the ongoing clashes between Brasília and
Washington DC also evolved in dialogue with changing U.S. politics, when Carter lost the 1980
election to Ronald Reagan. Figueiredo did not congratulate the Republican for his victory, and
the South American country went ahead with its foreign policy distant from U.S. influence.
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4.2 After the Presidential Visit

Even with all efforts led by Carter’s administration to rebuild the relationship with the
Brazilian government, the White House did not have Brasília’s reciprocity. Two months after the
U.S. President’s visit, President Geisel turned down an official invitation to visit Washington
DC.167 The official explanation delivered to the press by Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira
was “lack of time.”168 At this point, the ongoing tension in the bilateral relationship with Brazil
continued to be criticized by sectors of the American press as well as in the political and the
economic arenas. In reporting on “the steel sheds of a huge plant that makes reactor components”
in the city of Itaguaí (located in the state of Rio de Janeiro and built through the Brazilian nuclear
partnership with West Germany), The New York Times’ journalist, Juan de Onis, described it as a
symbol of the “failure” of Carter’s presidency nuclear-technology strategy in South America. 169
Economic issues continued to influence the tenor of international relations. U.S bankers
were in for at least $13.4 billion, according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
making Brazil their biggest debtor in the Third World.170 Moreover, American multinational
corporations had invested $6 billion in Brazil, the largest U.S. foreign investment after those of
Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, and France.171 Penny Lernoux, an author and investigative
reporter who specialized in Central and South American affairs, summarized this landscape by
writing that U.S. banks had no choice but to support Brazil’s military regime.172 In an editorial
167

New York Times, “Brazilian Declines Carter Invitation,” May, 1978, 14.
Ibid.
169
Juan de Onis, “Brazil Pushes Nuclear Effort in Spite of U.S.; Contract for Argentine Reactor,” New York Times,
August 12, 1989, 10.
170
Penny Lernoux, “Brazil Spends Its Way to the Guardhouse,” The Nation, June 28, 1980, 780.
171
Ibid, 781.
172
Ibid.
168

46
article, The Nation stated that “some leaders of these corporations have begun to feel that their
interests are now threatened by the arbitrary powers and the statist pretensions of the military
government.”173 The concerns around Brazil’s economy also reverberated in the United States
Congress. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee had shown that the oligopolistic
structure of Brazilian industry was the chief cause of inflation in the country.174 However, as
Penny Lernoux wrote in the same progressive magazine, for Brazil’s Ministry of Economy,
Delfim Neto, to accept this fact would be to renounce the entire course of development since
1964—the so-called “economic miracle”—in which he had played a large role.175
The conservative and progressive press were both uncomfortable with the way the White
House was dealing with Brasília, but each group suggested a different approach from the one
pursued by President Carter and his staff. The Nation stressed that Brazil’s need for democracy
was urgent since the maintenance of the military regime would increase “social unrest as more
people demand social justice.”176 According to the publication, Washington DC should offer
“sympathetic support”177 for those standing against the dictatorship. On the other hand, Erik
Leddihn, an Austrian conservative political scientist and National Review’s writer, stated that
Brazil was “not ready for democracy”178 due to the ideology of some Brazilian opposition
groups. Leddihn—as he mentioned the return of Luiz Carlos Prestes, exiled secretary-general of
the Brazilian Communist Party, to his country in 1979—remembered a quote by General Milton
Tavares de Souza, chief of the São Paulo military district: “Imagine a cobra dying of exposure
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during a storm. A passer-by feels sorry for it and puts it under his coat. As soon as it recovers
strength, the cobra bites its rescuer and kills him.”179
With that proverb, this National Review’s writer was calling attention to trends that
shaped the final months of Geisel’s presidency. Faced with inflation at an 85 percent annual
rate180 and widespread opposition from the business field and the political arena, the Brazilian
president needed to embrace liberalization, or risk losing control of the democratization
process.181 Geisel abolished the Institutional Act Number 5f—the regime’s most notorious decree
that resulted in the institutionalization of the torture—five months before the end of his
administration.182 On the other hand, while The New Republic wrote that the White House
believed that re-democratization in Brazil would help to stabilize the region, their editorialists
also highlighted that repressive laws were still on the books such as the long-standing National
Security Law183—that allowed the dictatorship to send oppositionists to prison. It was not clear,
therefore, when the Presidency would return to the civilians. President Geisel’s successor,
General João Figueiredo, was already scheduled to take office in March 1979 for a five-year
term.

4.3 General Figueiredo Takes Office

The former head of the military staff under President Emilio Medici, and the director of
the National Intelligence Service, the internal intelligence gathering agency, under Geisel,
Figueiredo assumed office on March 15th, 1979.184 Despite the new President’s promises of
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liberalization (“It is my unwavering purpose to make this country a democracy”, he said in his
first speech as Brazil’s chief of state),185 political and economic agents were not sure how sincere
his desire to pilot the country toward democracy.186 In the inauguration ceremony, Second Lady
Joan Mondale was a last-minute substitute for Vice President Mondale, who could not leave the
United States while President Carter was out of Washington DC on his Middle East travels. The
switch came as a keen disappointment to the Brazilians,187 The New York Times described, “who
are uncommonly sensitive about how they are perceived by the outside world and feel in
particular that America does not fully appreciate their size—Brazil is the fifth largest nation in
the world—or their importance.”188 Although the U.S. Embassy provided personal security to
Mrs. Mondale, the Second Lady did not receive special treatment by the Brazilian diplomacy and
watched the ceremony in the uncomfortable seats in the gallery of the Chamber of Deputies,189
the Brazilian House of Representatives.
To repair the episode, President Carter sent his Vice President to Brazil to meet with
Figueiredo in the following week, an initiative that was appreciated by the new government since
it might represent a new American approach to Brasília in which both countries would
comprehend and respect each other’s points of view.190 Upon his arrival, Mondale was warned by
local officials not to raise the subjects of human rights or nuclear power in his talks with
President Figueiredo.191 The Vice President praised the South American country by calling Brazil
“a nation whose importance has become truly global”192 and expressed that the bilateral relations

185

João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. Biblioteca da Presidência da República. “Discurso ao Receber a Faixa
Presidencial das Mãos do Presidente Ernesto Geisel” (Brasília: Presidência da República, 1979), 5.
186
New York Times, “New Brazilian Leader, Sworn In, Pledges Democracy,” March 16, 1979, 3.
187
Ibid.
188
Ibid.
189
Folha de S. Paulo, “Boliviano foi esquecido nos cumprimentos,” March 16, 1979, 4.
190
Folha de S. Paulo, “Itamarati confirma vinda de Mondale para quarta-feira,” March 17, 1979, 7.
191
New York Times, “Mondale Arrives in Brazil and is Warned on Talks,” March 22, 1979, 5.
192
Graham Hovey, “Mondale Sees New Brazil Leaders,” New York Times, March 23, 1979, 3.

49
were “excellent”193 at that point. Beyond that, Mondale stressed that the relationship between the
United States and Latin America had changed and it “had nothing to do with outdated concepts
such as automatic alignment”194—a statement that aimed to show that DC was willing to respect
the region’s independent foreign policies.
Beyond that, the Democrat brought Figueiredo the news regarding the agreement on
Brazil’s desire to send former Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira to DC as the new Brazilian
Ambassador in America.195 The gesture, as reported by Folha de S. Paulo, reinforced the
Brazilian “national pride”196 since Silveira was remembered by his clashes with U.S.
diplomacy—especially those regarding the visit of Mrs. Carter to Brazil in 1977. These
initiatives led by the White House towards the South American country were an attempt to
attenuate critics by the American Congress and the media. Republican senators stressed that
Brazil had become a “lost partner”197 due to Carter’s human rights campaign. At that point, the
U.S. government aimed to host Figueiredo for an official visit in Washington DC—something
that did not happen until the end of President Carter’s term.198 As Folha de S. Paulo discussed
the American’s approach to the new Brazilian government, the publication warned of the fact
that the United States was about to face a new electoral process. “It would be inappropriate to
establish close ties with Jimmy Carter’s negotiators at a time in which it may be the end of his
administration,”199 the newspaper stated. “Former Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira made the
mistake of strengthening the relationship with Henry Kissinger. He bet on Ford and lost. The
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consequences were catastrophic, since the first year of Carter’s administration was characterized
by bad will in the relationship with Brazil,” it added.200
Despite the efforts made by the American government, Brasília continued to develop its
own foreign policies. Figueiredo’s Foreign Minister, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, visited “Marxist
Angola and Mozambique in Africa, as well as neutralist Tanzania”, The New Republic
described.201 In fact, the United States welcomed better relations between Brazil and the African
Marxist countries on the theory that this would provide a possible alternative to their close links
with Cuba and the Soviet Union.202 However, the American magazine said, the Brazilians “were
doing it on their way, not as surrogates of the United States.”203 Moreover, the Peace Corps left
Brazil in 1980 at Brazil’s request and had never returned.204 A Brazilian official told The New
York Times that the country was still seeking partnerships with Washington DC, but Brasília
wanted America’s collaboration in a “less paternalistic way.”205
Meanwhile, the South American nation proceeded with its steps toward liberalization
under the regime’s control. In August 1979, President Figueiredo signed an Amnesty Law that
freed almost all political prisoners and exiles, although a provision of the same law exonerated
all those government officials who had been involved in the torture of the regime’s opponents.206
The reception of those who had been forced out of the country became a daily ritual by the end
of the 1970s.207 In November 1979—as a demonstration that the regime was still with the control
of the democratization process—the government issued the “Party Reform Bill”, which fractured
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the opposition into five distinct parties while the unpopular official party, ARENA, bonded
together into a single organization and renamed itself the PDS (Democratic Social Party).208
In the 1980 U.S. presidential elections, Jimmy Carter lost the race to the former Governor
of California, Ronald Reagan, in a campaign in which the relationship with Latin America was
not a highly debated issue. The country was struggling with domestic challenges such as the
energy crisis, unemployment, and inflation, and was preoccupied by the ongoing hostage crisis in
Iran. Roger Fontaine, an adviser on LATAM affairs to Ronald Reagan, who later became a
member of the National Security Council staff in the new administration, was in charge of
discussing those affairs with the press. He told The New York Times that Reagan’s presidency
would observe better “methods and tones.”209 in dealing with Latin America. In this statement, he
was

referencing the tensions between President Carter and the countries in the

region—especially during the first half of his administration when the First Lady met with
leaders such as Brazil’s President Ernesto Geisel. The impact of the democratic foreign policy
reverberated beyond Carter’s years in the Oval Office. President Figueiredo did not congratulate
Ronald Reagan for his victory in the Electoral College. “It’s their concern, not ours,” he said.210
If Brazil’s military regime had come into the Carter years frustrated for having established close
ties with Henry Kissinger, it left them even more disaffected. Despite Jimmy Carter’s evolution
toward more pragmatic diplomacy, Brazil’s leaders had little desire to court a close relationship
with Washington.
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1.

CONCLUSION

The political career of James Earl Carter Jr. demonstrates that the 39th President of the
United States was a moderate politician. Before taking office as Governor of Georgia in 1971, he
did not run as a progressive candidate. Carter started his political career in the early 1960s—a
decade in which Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. led the Civil Rights Movement from Atlanta. The
future American president never appeared together in public with MLK, but Carter promised to
invite Governor George Wallace from Alabama to visit Georgia during his successful
gubernatorial campaign in 1970. When he ran for President in 1976 against President Gerald
Ford, Carter saw the issue of human rights in Latin America as an opportunity to conquer liberal
and conservative voters. Both groups aimed to see more political stability in the region—the first
group due to ideological reasons and the second for the sake of a peaceful environment for
businesses. The Democratic candidate’s critiques against military regimes in Chile and Brazil
annoyed South American officials, but helped him to be elected.
As the new U.S. chief of state, Carter pursued a foreign policy aligned with his electoral
promises in the relationship with the Brazilian dictatorship. The First Lady’s visit to Brasília and
Recife in 1977 demonstrated the Carter’s administration’s antipathy toward the military regime.
Moreover, the American attempt to force West Germany to cancel its nuclear agreement with
Brazil was interpreted by Brasília as an attack on its national sovereignty. As the White House
noticed that President Ernesto Geisel would not back off from his country’s nuclear program and
his government decided to terminate a 25-year military treaty with DC, Carter decided to be
pragmatic. The U.S. president was under the pressure of American companies with business
interests in Brazil, the press, and the U.S. Congress. When Carter visited Brasília in 1978 to meet
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with Geisel, the White House did not criticize or mention the issue of human rights in Latin
America, but this change in tone did little to repair the strained relationship between the two
nations. Anti-American sentiment was widespread; like the nation's military leaders, the
opposition in the National Congress and the left-wing student movements had little appreciation
for Carter’s foreign policy towards the country. External interference in domestic affairs was not
acceptable in the Brazilian political landscape, and the U.S. presidential visit was not enough to
minimize the diplomatic tension. President Geisel rejected an official invitation to visit
Washington, and his successor in the presidential office, General João Figueiredo, did not
express interest in rebuilding the relationship with the White House. Brazil not only went ahead
with its nuclear program with Bonn, but also developed an independent foreign policy towards
Portuguese-speaking nations in Africa—especially Angola, whose government was ideologically
aligned with Moscow.
Carter’s approach to Brazil, therefore, kept the two nations apart politically and
diminished the influence of U.S. diplomacy in the South American nation—the largest economy
and the most populous country of Latin America. As DC noticed that the measures implemented
in the first two years of the new administration did not work effectively, the White House did not
hesitate to give up its discourse pro-human rights in order to meet the demands of U.S.
enterprises and attenuate the criticism from the conservative and liberal press. The attempts to
appease Brazil’s administration did not work as planned, however, and Brasília continued with
its own foreign policies. Near the end of Carter’s time in office, historical memory served to
exacerbate already-strained relations. The military regime—especially under Figueiredo’s
leadership—was affected by the previous frustrating experience with the relationship with Gerald
Ford’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who was replaced by Cyrus Vance due to Carter’s
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victory in 1976 against the incumbent Republican President. President Figueiredo, who took
office in 1979, did not want to engage with an administration that might lose a presidential
election in the following year.
The foreign policy of President Carter towards Brazil affected not only the relationship
between the two governments but also the connections between these two nations. Brasília
became afraid of establishing close links with DC since the transition between different U.S.
administrations seemed to be unpredictable regarding their foreign policies. That can be seen by
the way Brasília reacted to the results of the 1980 presidential election in which Ronald Reagan
defeated his opponent Jimmy Carter. The new President was from another party and won that
electoral race criticizing the policies of his predecessor. Nevertheless, Figueiredo did not
congratulate the former Governor of California for his victory.
In the final analysis, the Carter administration’s diplomatic efforts in Brazil were a
failure. Seen through a broader lens, the story of this failure underscores the risks that the United
States has historically taken, and continues to take, by implementing foreign policies without a
deep understanding of the political landscape abroad. Acting unilaterally and from a position of
ignorance can cause tensions with strategic partners and give rise to resistance against American
diplomacy in all political fields, ranging from national governments to the political parties and
popular movements that oppose them.
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